Survey of 100+ Energy Systems Reveals Critical OT Cybersecurity Gaps

"The findings are based on several years of deploying OMICRON's intrusion detection system (IDS) StationGuard in protection, automation, and control (PAC) systems. The technology, which monitors network traffic passively, has provided deep visibility into real-world OT environments. The results underscore the growing attack surface in energy systems and the challenges operators face in securing aging infrastructure and complex network architectures."

"StationGuard deployments, often carried out during security assessments, revealed vulnerabilities such as unpatched devices, insecure external connections, weak network segmentation, and incomplete asset inventories. In many cases, these security weaknesses were identified within the first 30 minutes of connecting to the network. Beyond security risks, the assessments also uncovered operational issues like VLAN misconfigurations, time synchronization errors, and network redundancy problems."

"In addition to technical shortcomings, the findings point to organizational factors that contribute to these risks - including unclear responsibilities for OT security, limited resources, and departmental silos. These findings reflect a growing trend across the energy sector: IT and OT environments are converging rapidly, yet security measures often fail to keep pace. How are utilities adapting to these complex risks, and what gaps remain that could leave critical systems exposed?"

OMICRON deployed its StationGuard intrusion detection system passively across more than 100 protection, automation, and control (PAC) installations, revealing recurring technical, organizational, and functional deficiencies. Assessments identified unpatched devices, insecure external connections, weak network segmentation, and incomplete asset inventories, with many issues discovered within 30 minutes of network connection. Operational problems included VLAN misconfigurations, time synchronization errors, and network redundancy failures. Organizational gaps involved unclear OT security responsibilities, limited resources, and departmental silos. Rapid IT–OT convergence is expanding the attack surface while security measures and asset management lag, leaving critical energy infrastructure vulnerable.

Read at The Hacker News