Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs) allow users to bid for transaction inclusion on a blockchain. Key properties include User Incentive Compatibility (UIC), Miner Incentive Compatibility (MIC), and a collusion-resilience measure called OCA-proofness. Ethereum's EIP1559 meets these requirements when no transaction contention exists, but fails UIC when there are excessive transactions for one block. The introduction of c-side-contract-proofness reveals that no TFM can satisfy UIC, MIC, and c-SCP under contention conditions, indicating inherent limitations in achieving all desired properties simultaneously.
Users participate in a transaction fee mechanism (TFM) to secure confirmation of their transactions by a blockchain protocol. The study focuses on user incentive compatibility (UIC), miner incentive compatibility (MIC), and a collusion-resilience measure known as OCA-proofness.
Ethereum's EIP1559 mechanism achieves UIC, MIC, and OCA-proofness under non-contention, but fails UIC with excessive transactions per block. Alternative collusion-resilience concept c-side-contract-proofness shows no TFM can meet UIC, MIC, and c-SCP during contention.
#blockchain #transaction-fee-mechanisms #incentive-compatibility #collusion-resilience #ethereum-eip1559
Collection
[
|
...
]