
"Iran possesses about 900 pounds of enriched uranium, which could be made into about 10 nuclear weapons. What do you do about that stuff when you declare that the war is over and our troops are coming home? If the mullahs manage to hold power in Iran, the continued existence of enriched uranium means that Iran would remain able to manufacture nukes pretty quickly. Why did we go to war anyway?"
"You could bomb it, I suppose, which would result in a contaminated conventional bomb site (not a nuclear explosion), but you wouldn't be sure that you'd eliminated the entire stockpile. You could decide to engage U.S. (or Israeli) ground troops in Iran, fighting their way to Isfahan, or Fordow, or Natanz, or wherever the uranium might be today. But the Israelis might decline to accept this task, and this is the sort of American commitment that Trump doesn't want to make."
Trump's anticipated declaration of victory in Iran and withdrawal of military operations before summer presents a critical problem: Iran possesses approximately 900 pounds of enriched uranium capable of producing roughly 10 nuclear weapons. This stockpile remains dangerous whether Iran's current government survives or the country descends into sectarian violence and state failure. Potential solutions each carry significant drawbacks: bombing risks environmental contamination without guaranteeing complete elimination; ground operations require commitments Trump opposes and Israel may refuse; covert extraction raids face Iranian preparedness. The fundamental question emerges: declaring victory while leaving enriched uranium unresolved undermines the original justification for military intervention, as Iran retains the capability to rapidly manufacture nuclear weapons.
#iran-nuclear-weapons #military-strategy #enriched-uranium #trump-administration #geopolitical-consequences
Read at Above the Law
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